Area of specialisation: ethics
My current project investigates collective action problems (voting, donating, consuming, etc.). Why should one act in certain ways if one’s individual conduct doesn’t make any difference?
Potential solutions I’m working on are based on expected utility, complicity and universalizability considerations.
My postdoc project investigated the epistemic condition of moral responsibility, namely the extent to which responsibility depends on the information we have, and when we should gather more information. For example, does ignorance excuse for our so-called slavery footprint?
- Externalism. Can the epistemic condition be analysed in terms of the available information rather than the perspective of the agent?
- Moral concern. According to recent voices, we are blameworthy when we don’t care enough – what does this mean?
- Strategic ignorance. What is strategic ignorance, and can strategically ignorant agents be held responsible (and in what sense)?
- Transfer. If you’re blameworthy for your ignorance, does this also make you blameworthy for your subsequent conduct?
Previously, I wrote a PhD dissertation on infinite regress arguments. It investigated what such arguments from many distinct philosophical debates have in common, and provided guidelines for using and evaluating them.
In epistemology, I’ve also been interested in suspension of judgment. What is it to suspend one’s judgment, and when and why should we do it?